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THE POLrnCS OF FAMILy LAw
Fran Olsen*
Family law,' like law in general, has two different aspects:
an apologetic aspect and a utopian aspect.2 In its apologetic as-
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. Goddard
College, BA, 1968; University of Colorado, J.D., 1971; Harvard University, SJ.D,
1984.
This is a revised version of a talk presented at Harvard Law School, April
15, 1981, to the League of Left Study Groups. I am grateful to Dede Donovan,
Stephanie Phillips, and Duncan Kennedy for their help in preparing the talk
and to Joe Singer for his help in revising it.
1. I use "family law" broadly to include statutes, regulations, and court deci-
sions involving (1) the formulation of families, (2) the rights and duties of
family members to each other, (3) the relationship of outsiders to family mem-
bers, and (4) the effects of dissolving a family. I do not deal here with the im-
portant question of what is a "family." On this question, see, e.g., Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972) (treating unmarried father and children as
family), and Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co, 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968)
(overturning state law denying wrongful death recovery to mother of illegiti-
mate decedent). Compare Restatement of Property 1 293 (1940) ("family" in-
cludes spouse and the issue, and no other persons), with Thompson v. Vestal
Lumber & Mfg. Co., 208 La. 83, 119, 22 So. 2d 842, 854 (1944) (unmarried couple
and illegitimate children constitute "family"); Goss v. Klipfel, 112 Colo. 87, 146
P.2d 217, 218 (1944) (members of religious order who lived and worked together
as "family"); Little Neck Community Ass'n. v. Working Organization for Re-
tarded Children, 52 A.D2d 90, 94, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367 (1976) (group home for
retarded children is a "family"). The most recent White House Conference on
Families spent considerable time debating a definition for "family." See N.Y.
Times, June 6, 1980, at B4, col. 1; ic:, Jan. 7, 1980, at D8, col. 1.
2. In this article, I use "apologetic" to mean intending to excuse or justify the
status quo by making its unjust aspects seem inevitable, or legitimate, or both.
I use "utopian" broadly to include both reformist and revolutionary efforts to
perfect society, or to reduce society's imperfections. The double motive, apolo-
getic and utopian, is characteristic of most or all fields of law, not just family
law. E.P. Thompson, the English historian and peace activist, has traced the
apologetic and utopian aspects of England's 18th century criminal law. See Ed-
ward Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (1976). See
also Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in Albion's Fatal
Tree 17-63 (D. Hay, P. Linebaugh, J. Rule, E. Thompson & C. Winslow eds. 1975)
(detailing the indirect support provided to England's class system by the 18th
century practice of both providing the death penalty for numerous minor of-
fenses, and granting frequent reprieves). Cf. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure
of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buffalo L Rev. 205, 210 (1979) (adopting the
premise that legal thinking involves both "an attempt to deny domination and
injustice" as well as "an effort to discover the conditions of social justice"). See
generally, Vilhelm Aubert, In Search of Law (1983) (law both a coercive mech-
anism for maintaining the status quo and a vehicle for expressing human aspi-
rations and needs).
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pect, family law tends to justify the domination of women by
men and the oppression of children by parents. Family law re-
inforces the most common forms of male domination and pa-
rental oppression by characterizing them as legal. Family law
tends to pacify family members by concealing from their scru-
tiny how damaging and restrictive family relationships often
are.3 Furthermore, family law makes our present forms of fam-
ily life seem "natural," 4 and therefore unlikely to change very
much. In this way, family law encourages minor reforms and
individual adjustments, while discouraging imaginative specu-
lation or creative changes in family structure. We forget that a
radically different form of social life would seem equally natu-
ral once we had established it.
In its utopian aspect, family law records successive efforts
to make the reality of human association live up to our hopes
and aspirations. Legal struggles have resulted in a variety of
family reforms and have increased the options available to
each individual. Lawyers and judges have introduced notions
of fairness into family life; they have created the vocabulary
necessary to argue for justice for women and for children. 5
Family law helps to shape our culture and contributes to the
development of shared meanings and aspirations regarding
family life.6
3. For a variety of criticisms of contemporary family life, see Michelle Bar-
rett, Women's Oppression Today (1980); David Cooper, The Death of the Fam-
ily (1971); Anna Demeter, Legal Kidnapping (1977); Carolyn Heilbrun,
Reinventing Womanhood 171-97 (1979); Eli Zaretsky, Capitalism, the Family, &
Personal Life (1976). See alao Barbara Easton, Feminism and the Contempo-
rary Family, in Socialist Rev., May-June 1978, at 11, reprinted in A Heritage of
Her Own 555 (Nancy Cott & Elizabeth Pleck eds. 1979).
4. See Michelle Barrett & Mary McIntosh, The Anti-Social Family 34-40 (1982)
(examining the role of the claim that the family is "natural" in the ideology of
familialism and criticizing the implication that humans cannot or should not
construct radically different forms of social life).
5. For example, the concepts of "women's rights" and "children's rights" in
family law are largely a creation of family law judges and practitioners. But cf.
Fran Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Righti Analysis, 62 Texas
L Rev. (forthcoming 1984) (demonstrating that the language of "rights" can im-
pede discussions of justice for women). The early history of the child protec-
tion movement poignantly illustrates the failure of 19th century law to
conceptualize children as rights-bearing individuals: the first cases of child
abuse were dealt with under the laws for the prevention of cruelty to animals,
because there were no laws against cruelty to children. See 2 Children and
Youth in America 185-89 (Robert Bremner ed. 1971).
6. As James Boyd White puts it: "(T]he law can more properly be seen not
as a set of commands or rules, even with a set of restatable principles or values
behind them, but as the culture of argument and interpretation through the op-
erations of which the rules acquire their life and ultimate meaning." James
White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 Texas L
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When I say that family law legitimates oppression or that
it contributes to our utopian aspirations, I am much more con-
cerned with the kinds of arguments that courts and attorneys
frame and accept than with the particular outcomes of legisla-
tive battles or with the direct results of court decisions. The ar-
guments presented in these battles and decisions illustrate and
support particular patterns of thought and behavior. Family
law both reflects and helps create an ideology of the family-a
structure of images and understandings of family life. This ide-
ology serves to deny and disguise the ways that families illegit-
imately dominate people and fail to serve human wants.
Embedded within the ideology of the family are notions of (1)
the kinds of roles that individual members should serve within
the family and what they should get out of these roles, (2) the
kinds of bonds that hold families together, (3) the actual and
the proper role of families in society, and (4) what the state or
law can and should do to encourage desirable family life.
Most family law scholarship focuses on the utopian aspect
of law, 7 and ignores law's apologetic, legitimating role. In fam-
ily law, perhaps more than in any other field of law, the litera-
ture tends to rationalize and criticize existing doctrine on a low
level of abstraction,8 and to focus attention primarily upon
some proposed reform. Most family law scholars argue in favor
of some minor change in the law and analyze previous cases to
show that the legal reasoning or the results of the cases sup-
Rev. 415, 436 (1982). White maintains that law establishes a community in
many of the same ways that literature does. "The lawyer's work... contrib-
utes to a process of collective or cultural education that is in structure analo-
gous to that experienced by the single reader of the literary text." Id. at 435.
7. A great deal of what is written on family law purports to be primarily de-
scriptive, and for a commentator to deal with even the utopian aspirations of
law--that is, to intend to promote reform-seems sometimes to require an ex-
planation or justification. When Homer Clark included his "own criticisms of
legal principles" in his family law treatise, and "suggest[ed) the directions in
which the law ought to move," he considered it appropriate to alert the reader
to this fact in his preface, and he asserted that "there is probably much more of
personal opinion here than in most law books." Homer Clark, The Law of Do-
mestic Relations in the United States xi (1968).
8. By this I mean that most family law scholars write about doctrine-that is,
about legal rules and the arguments advanced to justify or oppose these rules-
and do not attempt to derive from this doctrine any more general or abstract
principles. More importantly, they do not attempt to examine the deeper as-
sumptions that are taken for granted in family law arguments. Most reformist
or utopian family law scholars do not presuppose any highly abstract, inte-
grated system of legal reasoning that would treat a large variety of specific
rules in family law doctrine as logically related or intimately bound together
such that a change in one rule would require major changes in other rules.
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port the proposed change.9 Occasionally, scholars vary this
method by presenting the reasoning or results of earlier cases
as an abomination, thereby dramatizing the great need for the
particular reform they have proposed.o Regardless of their in-
tentions, these scholars help perpetuate oppressive family in-
stitutions. By advocating only minor reforms in family law,
they convey the message that family law is basically fair. Be-
cause they discourage us from considering more radical
change, their work contributes to the apologetic project of legit-
imating the status quo.
This essay explores the political significance of family law.
Part I argues that we need a more thorough understanding of
the complex relationship between individual legal skirmishes
and broader, general battles for social change. Part II places
the issue in its historical context by relating it to the "liberali-
zation of the family"--the major historical shift that has taken
place in the family over the past two centuries." Part LU uses
the theoretical language and structures introduced in Part 11 to
analyze the "tender years doctrine" of child custody law. I ex-
amine how women were both helped and hurt by the rise of the
tender years doctrine and similarly helped and hurt by its re-
cent abolition. I conclude that legal reform paradoxically
serves both to legitimate our oppressive and patriarchal status
quo, and to promote emancipation. We have no simple, a priori
formula that we can apply to decide whether to support legal
reforms. The choice to support or not to support any particular
reform is a political decision we cannot avoid. To choose
wisely, we must undertake a complex and contextual evalua-
tion of all the effects of the reform,1 2 a project that this essay
attempts to assist.
9. See, e.g., Briggitte Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Cus-
tody, and Excessive Modifications, 65 Calif. L Rev. 978 (1977); Carol Bruch, The
Legal Import of Informal Marital Separations: A Survey of California Law
and a Call for Change, 65 Calif. L Rev. 1015 (1977).
10. See, e.g., Briggitte Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22
Vand. L Rev. 1207, 1207-16 (1969); Leonard Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the
Interstate Child Custody Problem: A Reply to Professor Currie and a Proposed
Uniform Act, 38 S. Cal. L Rev. 183, 183-96 (1965).
11. See infra p. 6 .
12. There are also other advantages to a complex and contextual evaluation.
In the case of the tender years doctrine, for example, such an evaluation sug-
gests alternatives to the doctrine that retain many of the doctrine's positive as-
pects, while diminishing its negative aspects. See infra pp. 18-19.
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1. Law and Politics
Many feminists believe that the legal system is inherently
patriarchal-that patriarchal principles are deeply embedded
within the structure of legal thought and legal reasoning.13
Feminist attorneys realize that whenever they win a lawsuit
that appears to further women's rights, their victory is seldom,
if ever, a pure victory. Although a successful court battle wins
a practical benefit for a woman and satisfies a need or want of
hers, the method of meeting this need or want disempowers
her. Moreover, participating in the existing legal institutions,
which are generally oppressive toward women, may legitimate
both the legal system and the ideological structure on which it
is based.
This analysis is correct as far as it goes, but it is incom-
plete. A court victory results not only in good practical effects,
but also in bad practical effects.14 Also, rather than having only
bad ideological effects, a court victory simultaneously has good
ideological effects. Thus, it is important to evaluate each partic-
ular battle in terms of its actual overall effect, from both a prac-
tical and an ideological point of view.
We can counteract some of the negative effects that often
accompany legal victories. The lawyer's characterization of a
legal outcome can serve to enhance the positive and diminish
the negative ideological effects of using the court system for a
partial gain.15 A particularized evaluation of the actual effects
of a lawsuit is important also because the practical benefits
may be unexpectedly insignificant16 or counterbalanced by un-
I& See, e.g., Janet Rifldn, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 Harv.
Women's Law J. 83 (1980); Diane Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patri-
archy, in The Politics of Law (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Adrienne Rich, Introduction
to Anna Demeter, Legal Kidnapping (1977); Zillah Eisenstein, Feminism and
Crisis in Liberal America 124-27 & passim (forthcoming 1984). See generally
Catharine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex
Discrimination (1979); Catharine MacKinnon, Book Review, 34 Stan. L Rev. 703
(1982) (reviewing Ann Jones, Women Who Kill (1980)).
14. For example, the classic Muller v. Oregon case, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), which
upheld ten-hour day legislation for women only, was an important practical vic-
tory for women working in sex-segregated jobs, but a practical defeat for wo-
men who were pushed out of non-segregated jobs by men who could work
longer hours.
15. For example, Jeanne Charn of the Legal Services Institute has suggested
that poverty lawyers should emphasize to their clients that, however nice it
might be to have just won a lawsuit, the victory obtained is only a portion of
what the client actually deserves and should get. Jeanne Charn, Panel on Law
and the Working Class Family, Sixth National Conference on Critical Legal
Studies, Harvard Law School (March 19, 1982).
16. Consider the Supreme Court case of Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). It
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anticipated disadvantages. If we anticipate or recognize only
negative ideological effects and positive practical effects, our
analysis is less accurate than it should be. Almost every legal
change has both practical and ideological advantages and dis-
advantages. It is crucial for us to recognize and analyze each of
these effects.
11. The Liberalization of the Family
The phenomenon I refer to as the "liberalization of the
family"17 should be understood in the context of these complex
effects. The pre-liberal family, which I characterize loosely as
the "feudal" family, was a social, economic, and political unit of
feudal society.' 8 For many years after the disintegration of feu-
dal society, the image of the "feudal" family continued to exert
an influence on law. The "feudal" family was a communal hier-
archy, based on unequal duties of protection and obedience,
and was expected to serve important public functions.19 The
"liberal" family, on the other hand, is thought to be a voluntary
collection of individuals held together by bonds of sentiment in
an egalitarian structure. Supposedly, it constitutes a private
realm, clearly divorced from the "public sphere."20 Although
there are relatively few defined roles in the "liberal" family, the
few family obligations that do exist are considered properly en-
forceable by the state, generally through broad discretionary
standards.21 It is said that standards, unlike rules, permit the
state to deal with each situation on the.basis of its own particu-
appeared to be a practical victory, because it saved money for certain women,
but an ideological defeat, because it reinforced the ideology of sexual inequal-
ity. Upon examination, however, the actual practical effects turn out to be min-
imal. The statute in question provided that women who outlived their
husbands could avoid an ad valorem tax on $500 worth of their property. Even
if the tax rate were 104, this "savings" would amount to only $50.
17. See Fran Olsen, The Family and the MarkeL" A Study of Ideology and Le-
gal Reform, 96 Harv. L Rev. 1497, 1517 (1983).
18. See Jean Flandrin, Families in Former Times 1-2 & passim (1976). For a
criticism of many uses of the term "the family" and for a warning that the use
of concepts such as the "feudal" family may tend "to impose an essential simi-
larity on highly diverse institutions and practices," see Barrett & McIntosh,
supra note 4, at 39.
19. See Flandrin, supra note 18.
20. See Robert Mnookin, The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Disagree-
ment and Academic Repudiation, 130 U. Pa. L Rev. 1429 (1982). But see Olsen,
supra note 17, at 1504-28.
21. Child custody law presents the most striking example of the shift toward
broad, discretionary standards. See Robert Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudica.
tion: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Summer 1975, at 226, 233. ("The history of the legal standards governing cus-




The shift from the "feudal" to the "liberal" family, which
has occurred in America during the last three centuries, is
often conceptualized as progress: the bad, old, rigid, patriar-
chal family was replaced by the modern, all-American, egalita-
rian family.23 Alternatively, some see this change in negative
terms: the feudal, or at least the openly-patriarchal family is
romanticized as a stable, loving refuge from the world of com-
merce and industry, in contrast to the modern, "liberal" family,
which is considered alienated, isolated, atomistic, and even
pathological.2 4  Both of these characterizations-the positive
and the negative-are severely flawed. We must develop a
richer and more detailed description of the liberalization of the
family to understand and begin to unravel the structure of
thought and the patterns of behavior that affect our present
conception of "the family" and its relationship to the state.m
The liberalization of the family has entailed significant
changes along many different dimensions.26 This essay ex-
plores two of these dimensions: the hierarchy -* equality di-
mension, and the group o individual dimension.
Each of these dimensions describes gradual changes in
the substantive behavior and roles expected of family mem-
bers. The hierarchy o equality dimension involves the shift
from an intentional, acknowledged hierarchy, to a supposedly
rules to a highly discretionary principle gradually shorn of narrowing proce-
dural devices.")
22. For a good discussion of the relationships between rules and standards,
see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
Harv. L Rev. 1685, 1687-1701 (1976).
23. See, e.g., Alexis DeTocqueviule, Democracy in America 228-33 (R. Heffner
ed. 1956); 1 James Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Marriage, Divorce, Sepa-
ration and Domestic Relations § 4 (6th ed. 1921); Michael Gordon, The Ameri-
can Family 17-22 (1978). See generally Robert Nisbet, History of the Idea of
Progress (1980).
24. See, e.g., Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World: the Family
Beseiged (1977). See generally William Goode, World Revolution and Family
Patterns 6-7 (1963) (noting the same double-view in attitudes toward the kind
of families many people falsely imagine existed in early America).
25. For a criticism of treating "the family" as a pre-given entity and thus as
natural rather than social, see Barrett, supra note 3, at 187-88; Barrett & McIn-
tosh, supra note 4. It may be helpful to think of "the family" not as a thing, but
as an idea, or a cluster of ideas.
26. I discuss the six dimensions I consider to be the most important in a work-
in-progress on the history of child custody law in the United States. I charac-
terize these dimensions as (1) rules - standards, (2) enforcement - non-
enforcement (or direct enforcement - indirect enforcement), (3) hierarchy
- equality, (4) group - individual, (5) public - private, and (6) duty
sentiment. Fran Olsen, A History of Child Custody Law as Ideology (Feb.
4, 1982) (unpublished manuscript).
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egalitarian family of juridical equals. The group -- individual
dimension involves the shift from the family as a corporate unit
to the family as a voluntary association of individuals.
A. The Hierarchy Dimension
Each of these dimensions can best be conceptualized as a
continuum, involving matters of degree rather than an all-or-
nothing choice.27 The hierarchy continuum, however, also in-
volves gradual shifts between four different structures of hier-
archy. With some overlap, these four structures have
succeeded one another chronologically.28
1. Structures of Hierarchy. - In the more-feudal, less-lib-
eral family-for example, the family described by Black-
stone 29-the father was the undisputed head of the family, and
the wife and children were all subordinate to him: - 30
Within this structure, there were differing images of the father
as the sovereign head or as the representative of the family,
and differing notions of the extent and nature of the subordina-
tion of the family to the father. There was, however, basic
agreement that the father had the authority and responsibility
to act for the family.
Successful political and legal struggles eroded some of the
father's power, and the family began to have a new structure:
27. In other words, it is not the case that one family is hierarchical and an-
other egalitarian, or one communal and another individualistic. Rather, one is
more or less hierarchical than another, and more or less communal than
another.
28. These structures of hierarchy emerged from my work with child custody
law, and I explain them in greater detail in that work. See Olsen, supra note 26.
The following is an empirical description of the changes I believe actually took
place historically. Logically, none of the changes would have had to take place
as they did. For example, the structure of hierarchy could have remained un-
changed, or there could have been more than four structures, or none at all.
Also, as a logical matter, the structures could have shifted in a more random
pattern.
29. See 1 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries $430-33. In Blackstone's
scheme, the wife lost her separate legal identity upon marriage, and the hus-
band was empowered to act on her behalf. For example, in lawsuits, the hus-
band generally had to be named as co-plaintiff or co-defendant with his wife,
and she generally could not enter into contracts without his concurrence. Chil-
dren were similarly subordinate to the father. He could discipline them and
had a right to their "services" until the age of 21. Id. at '441.
30. In this, and in subsequent diagrams, "F" refers to father, "M" to mother,
and "C" to child or children.
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I . The father was still head of the family and still the hierar-
chical superior, but the hierarchy itself became more open to
question. If the father were removed Lrom the family, the
mother would become the new head of the family. Under the
first structure, according to Blackstone, the mother was entitled
to nothing more than "reverence and respect;"31 under this sec-
ond structure, in the father's absence, the mother had the same
kind of authority enjoyed by the father. Although the father in
this second structure still retained considerably more authority
than the mother, and although his authority took complete pre-
cedence over the mother's, the change was nevertheless impor-
tant. The second structure treated the mother as a separate
person with a juridical personality of her own. If the father
died, the mother became entitled to the custody and services of
her children, just as the father had been during his life. 32 Also,
some courts claimed the authority to find a father unfit, remove
him from the hierarchy, and award custody to the mother.33
The third and fourth structures embody today's ideologies
of legal equality in family life. The third structure represents
a significant shift: Fc-Ml. Here, the mother and the father are
juridical equals. Theoretically, both have similar rights over
their children, and neither spouse is legally superior to the
other. The fourth structure is the least hierarchical: [FiM. C .
Here, the child comes into her own as a legal personality, and
each person in the family is treated as a juridical equal.
2. The Legitimation of Hierarchy. - Different explana-
tions or rationalizations for the inferior status of women corre-
spond to these different hierarchical structures. Within each of
31. See I Blackstone, supra note 29, at "441 ("[AI mother, as such, is entitled
to no power, but %nly to reverence and respect.")
32. In 19th century England, the father was entitled to appoint a testamentary
guardian for his children so that, upon his death, the mother might have virtu-
ally no power over them. For an American case recognizing this power in a fa-
ther but granting a period of delay-in order to protect the interest of the
children-before implementing the father's will, see Wood v. Wood, 5 Paige Ch.
596, 605-06 (N.Y. Ch. 1836).
33. See Rollin Hurd, A Treatise on the Right of Personal Liberty and on the
Writ of Habeas Corpus 47-48 (1858).
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these four structures, men have offered somewhat different jus-
tifications for the subordination of women.
The first two structures involved similar justifications. In
the first structure, l-i , the subordination of women was so
taken for granted that it was almost invisible. The father was
the head of the family; fathers had been the heads of families
since time "immemorial."
34 In the second structure, H ,
women were said to be inferior because God or nature made
men superior.3 5 Apologists of male supremacy generally did
not argue that women implicitly consented to an inferior status
when they agreed to marry men, but these apologists explained
the hierarchy as natural or as a matter of convenience, if not
necessity.s6
In the third structure, , apologists deny the inferior
status of women. Women are not subordinate to men; they are
just different from men. Men have their sphere, and women
have their separate "but equal" sphere. The apologists hope
that no one notices the very real differences between these two
spheres--that men keep wealth, power and influence in their
sphere, and leave in women's sphere unpaid service and nur-
turance obligations.
Current justifiers claim that in the fourth structure,
iT M iC{, everyone is equal. Here, they say, perceived differ-
ences among family members are simply private, isolated oc-
currences. Members of the family are juridically equal, in the
same sense that workers and their bosses are juridically
34. The concept of "immemorial" custom, custom followed since "time out of
mind," was developed by the English jurist Lord Coke, who, in the 17th cen-
tury, explained and justified English common law on the bads of custom. See
John Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law 30-55 (1957).
35. See, e.g., I Corinthians 11:3-11:16, 1 Timothy 2:8-2:15.
36. For an analysis of Blackstone's use of necessity, convenience and implied
consent to justify hierarchy, see Kennedy, supra note 2, at 304-11. In 1861, a
New York court refused to follow the state's equal guardianship statute (each
parent has equal guardianship rights over the child) because the judge be-
lieved that the family hierarchy was necessary. See People ex reL. Brooks v.
Brooks, 35 Barb. 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861).
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equal.37 This view treats women's subordination as though it
occurred by chance. That men happen to earn almost twice as
much money as women, and that this affects the social rela-
tions between the sexes is, according to this view, not the
state's concern. Similarly, that children are economically de-
pendent upon their parents, and that parents sometimes use
this dependency to dominate or exploit their children, is like-
wise not the state's concern. Rather, the mistreatment of wives
and children is simply a series of unfortunate individual
occurrences.
B. The Group Dimension
The group - individual dimension places the family as a
corporate unit at one end of a continuum, and the family as a
collection of individuals at the other end. The more communal
or collective direction focuses on the family as a single, undif-
ferentiated unit; the more individual direction focuses not on
the family unit itself, but rather on the particular members of
the family and on their contractual agreements, implied or
express.
Historically, the hierarchy dimension and the group di-
mension were related--the more hierarchical family was also
more communal, and the more egalitarian family was also more
individualistic. This was empirically true, but not logically nec-
essary. It could have been different. A communal (or juridi-
cally intermingled) family could be non-hierarchical, just as a
hierarchical family could be non-communal. Nevertheless, we
often forget the contingency of history and unnecessarily limit
our conception of the possibilities of human association. Our
historical experience with the liberalization of the family
makes us assume--often without realizing it-that the only al-
ternatives are patriarchy on one hand, and atomistic individual-
ism on the other.38 This is similar to the choices available to
the nineteenth century woman: she could join a patriarchal
family or be alone.39 There were almost no other alternatives.
Many of today's right-wing women similarly see no alternatives
and urge a return4O to the patriarchal family as the only way to
37. See Olsen, supra note 17, at 1515.
38. See id. at 1530.
39. On the difficulties faced by women who did not marry in 19th century Eng-
land, see the novels of Jane Austen, especially Emma. Jane Austen, Emma
(1816).
40. Frequently, those who romanticize the patriarchal family assume that
present families are far less patriarchal than they actually are.
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achieve closeness and commitment.41
We can understand the group ---* individual continuum
best by considering each of its two poles. The early notion that
the legal personality of a married woman merged into her hus-
band's is an extreme illustration of communalism.42 The ideas
of guardianship and wardship of children likewise are classic
communal notions.43 At the opposite end of the continuum, the
individualism pole ignores group membership and focuses on
the autonomous individual.
The significance of marriage varies across the continuum.
In the more communal direction, marriage creates the group; it
marks the beginning of a new family. In the more individual di-
rection, marriage alters the individual rights of the two people
who marry. As one moves along the continuum from the more
communal toward the more individual direction, people's rights
cease to change automatically by marriage and begin to change
only by the implicit or explicit agreement of the parties. Mar-
riage ceases to create an entity or to be a status;44 instead, it
becomes a contract negotiated between two individuals.45
Concrete examples can illustrate the relationship of these
two dimensions, hierarchy and group, to an analysis of the pos-
itive and negative effects of changes in family law. This essay
presents two such examples: the rise and the fall of the tender
years doctrine.
III. The Tender Years Doctrine
The "tender years doctrine" is actually not a single doc-
trine, but a collection of various rules that once gave preference
41. See Andrea Dworkin, Right-Wing Women (1983).
42. See I Blackstone, supra note 29, at *430.
43. Although guardianship and wardship originated as proprietary institutions
concerned with the devolution of real property, by the 19th century they had
lost this quality and become purely protective. The rules that characterize the
relationship of guardianship or wardship are those that embody the ideals of
regulation, paternalism, community, and informality, in contrast to the individ-
ualistic ideals of facilitation, self-determination, autonomy, and formality. See
generally Kennedy, supra note 22, at 1732-37.
44. Joel Bishop introduced the idea that marriage created a status, Joel
Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce and Evidence in
Matrimonial Suits, § 29-30, at 25-26, and J 41, at 34-35 (1852), and the idea imme-
diately became popular. See Joel Bishop, New Commentaries on Marriage, Di-
vorce and Separation as to the Law, Evidence, Pleading, Practice, Forms and
the Evidence of Marriage in all Issues on a New System of Legal Exposition,
§ 34 at 13-14 (1891).
45. See Marjorie Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for
State Policy, 70 Calif. L Rev. 204, 280-86 (1982).
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to the mother in a custody battle over a child of tender years.46
It arose in the nineteenth century, flourished early in the twen-
tieth, and was abolished in the latter part of the twentieth cen-
tury.47 The rise and the fall of this doctrine were both partial
victories and partial defeats for women. To understand why
this is so, we must examine the ideological significance of the
tender years doctrine as well as its more immediate, practical
effects.
A The Rise of the Tender Years Doctrine
Throughout the nineteenth century, there were scattered
custody cases in which courts preferred the mother simply be-
cause she was the mother,48 but this practice did not actually
become a doctrine until early in the twentieth century. In
some jurisdictions the tender years doctrine was a "tie-
breaker": if other factors were equal, the court placed a child
of tender years in the custody of the mother.49 In its strongest
form, the tender years doctrine mandated that a court award
custody of a young child to the mother unless she were proven
unfit or a danger to the child.50
1. As a Victory for Women. - (a) Ideological Victory.
The rise of the tender years doctrine was an ideological victory
for women insofar as it acknowledged and established that wo-
men were capable of heading families. Not only could women
head families after their husbands died, but they were also the
preferred parent upon the breakup of a marriage. This mater-
nal preference both reflected and reinforced a greater accept-
ance of female-headed families. The rise of the tender years
46. See Allan Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes,
15 J. Faro. L 423 (1976-77); Rena Uviller, Father's Rights and Feminism: The Ma-
ternal Presumption Revisited, 1 Harv. Women's L. J. 107 (1978). See also, Nancy
Polikoff, Why are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child
Custody Determination&, 7 Women's Rts. L Rep. 235, 235 n.1 (1982).
47. See Polikof, supra note 46, at 235-38.
48. See, e.g., Foster v. Alston, 7 Miss. (6 Howard) 406 (1842) (dissent); Com-
monwealth ex reL Myers v. Myers, 18 Pa. C. 385 (1896); DeHauteville v. Sears
(Court of General Sessions for City and County of Philadelphia, Nov. 14, 1840).
reported in Hurd, supra note 33, at 481-83.
49. See, e.g., McCreery v. McCreery, 218 Va. 352, 237 S.E.2d 167 (1977).
50. See, e.g., Bruce v. Bruce, 141 Okla. 160, 285 P. 30 (1930).
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doctrine marked a clear shift from the second structure of hier-
archy towards the third, that is, from to F .
(b) Practical Victory. - The rise of the tender years doc-
trine was an important practical victory for women, especially
for separated or divorced women who wanted custody of their
children. Not only was the doctrine an improvement over the
common law rule preferring the father as custodial parent,5 1
but it also provided an appealing alternative to the "fault
rule"--followed by some courts-that the parent not at fault in
the marital breakup should receive custody of the children.
During the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centu-
ries, the law defined "fault" in such a way that a husband could
make married life intolerable without giving his wife legal
grounds for a separation.5 2 Often, the wife's only recourse was
to leave the family home. More often, her only weapon against
such abuse was to threaten to leave. If a wife exercised her
only option, or carried out her threat, her husband could charge
that she deserted him and take away her children.5 3 For wo-
men, the tender years doctrine marked a clear improvement
over child custody decisions based on fault.
In addition to enabling more women to leave abusive hus-
bands without losing their children, the tender years doctrine
also increased the power of women both during the marriage
and in the event of separation or divorce. Men usually had, and
continue to have, more economic power and greater earning po-
tential than women. This has given men greater power within
51. See Tarkington v. State, 1 Ind. 171 (1848); Hurd, supra note 33. But see
Blisset's Case, 98 Eng. Rep. 899 (L.B. 1774) (Mansfield, L).
52. For example, although a wife's single act of adultery would constitute
grounds for divorce, an adulterous husband would not give his wife grounds for
divorce unless his adultery was repeated or flagrant. See Clark, supra note 7,
§ 12.2, at 328 & n.9. Similarly, a husband's single act of brutality was usually not
grounds for divorce. See id Moreover, the wife had the burden of proving-
sometimes by more than a mere preponderance of the evidence--repeated or
particularly vicious acts of cruelty. Habitual drunkenness was often a ground
for divorce, but again, sufficient proof could be difficult. For a particularly strik-
ing example of the plight of an abused wife, see Bryan v. Bryan, 34 Ala. 516
(1859).
53. See, e.g., People ex rel Sternberger v. Sternberger, 12 App. Div. 398 (N.Y.
1896); People ex reL Brooks v. Brooks, 35 Barb. 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861); Bryan
v. Bryan, 34 Ala. 516 (1859); Taylor v. Taylor, 103 Va. 750 (1905); Commonwealth
v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203 (1834).
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their marriages; women generally have had a greater economic
incentive to make their marriages successful. The tender years
doctrine began to redistribute power somewhat in the woman's
favor.54 When fathers stood to lose their children upon separa-
tion or divorce, men had a greater emotional incentive to keep
their marriages intact.55
2. As a Defeat for Women. - (a) Ideological Defeat. -
The rise of the tender years doctrine was also an ideological de-
feat for women. The characteristics attributed to women and
said to make them i-suited for public life were the very same
characteristics embraced by the rhetoric of the tender years
doctrine.56 The doctrine reinforced the ideology of inequality,
which stated that a woman's place is in the home. The doctrine
therefore helped keep women in their place-that is, in the
home serving others, and not out in public gaining power or
making money.
(b) Practical Defeat. - The rise of the tender years doc-
trine was also a practical defeat for women. The doctrine al-
ways allowed courts discretion to deny custody to a mother
found "unfit," and judges manipulated the concept of unfitness
to keep women subservient to their husbands.5 7 If a woman
were too independent, or did not fit the pedestal image of the
tender years doctrine, courts would label her unfit. Thus, a wo-
man might compromise her own happiness within the marriage
54. See David Daube, Dividing a Child in Antiquity, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1630, 1633
(1966).
55. One might question whether it really benefits a woman if a man remains
in a relationship with her only because he wants to be around his children.
This is similar to the question whether it benefits a man if a woman struggles
to keep their relationship intact because of her economic dependence on him.
The easy and appealing answer is that neither spouse benefits-that human re-
lations should be independent of any such ulterior motives. The Soviet Union
puts this ideal as follows: "Soviet legislation on marriage and the family is
designed to actively encourage the final liberation of family relations from ma-
terialistic calculations...." Basic Principles of Legislation in the USSR and
Union Republics on Marriage and the Family (as amended on June 25, 1968, by
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR), quoted in 0. M. Stone, The New Fundamen-
tal Principles of Soviet Family Law and Their Social Background, 18 Int. &
Comp. L. Q. 392, 410 (1969). However, this easy and appealing answer neglects
the complexity of relationships and of human motives. These concerns cannot
be divorced from human relationships. People exist in a social and economic
setting and this setting necessarily affects all of their relations with others.
56. See Annamay Sheppard, Unspoken Premises in Custody Litigation, 7 Wo-
men's Rts. L. Rep. 229, 229.30 (1982).
57. This, of course, has an ideological as well as a practical component. As a
practical matter, women could be punished or penalized for overstepping the
role prescribed for them by men. Ideologically, this power enabled the courts
to shape society's view of what behavior was "fit" for women.
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and make considerable personal sacrifices only to be branded
"unfit" and have her children taken away. The tender years
doctrine discouraged women from pursuing their own goals
and encouraged women to be subservient and obedient.
B. The Fall of the Tender Years Doctrine
In the late twentieth century, the tender years doctrine
came under increasing criticism. Fathers argued that it dis-
criminated against them irrationally on the basis of their gen-
der, and that courts should decide custody simply on the basis
of the child's best interests. Each case, according to these fa-
thers, should be decided on its individual facts, and the gender
of the parental contestants should be irrelevant.5 8 The majority
of courts accepted these arguments and most states have now
abolished any custodial preference for the mother.59 The fall of
the tender years doctrine correlates with the shift from the
third to the fourth structure of hierarchy, that is, from IF to
1. As a Defeat for Women. - (a) Practical Defeat. -
One practical effect of the fall of the tender years doctrine is
that many more mothers are losing custody of their children.6 0
Practicing lawyers complain that almost any father who really
tries can now win custody of his children.61 It is not necessary
to know the precise statistics in order to know that for most
mothers, the risk of losing their children in a custody battle is
considerably greater after the fall of the tender years doctrine
than it was before. This risk increases women's fear of divorce
and it may well reduce their power within the marriage. The
husband still maintains his economic advantage, 2 but the wife
has lost the emotional advantage she might have had.6 More-
over, fathers can extract significant economic concessions from
mothers and can generally harass and intimidate women with
the threat of a custody battle. The outcome of a custody fight is
very unpredictable because custody decisions are now highly
58. See Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv. L
Rev. 1156, 1333-38 (1980).
59. See Henry Foster & Doris Freed, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview,
14 Fain. L.Q. 229 (1981).
60. See Polikoff, supra note 46.
61. See id.




individualized determinations made on a case-by-case basis,
rarely subject to meaningful appellate review.64 This creates
an anomaly: the more devoted a mother is to her child, the
more the mother has to lose in a custody fight. To avoid the
risks of a custody battle, many mothers who are clearly the bet-
ter custodian for their children are nevertheless intimidated
into giving up alimony, property settlement and child support
money that they and their children need in order to live com-
fortably.65 This dynamic contributes to the widespread poverty
of women and children.66
(b) Ideological Defeat. - Although the fall of the tender
years doctrine is usually considered an ideological victory for
women,67 it is also an ideological defeat. The individualized na-
ture of current custody decisions denies the political signifi-
cance of women as a group: when women lose custody of their
children, the state, and many people, consider the phenomenon
to be a private, individual matter. They overlook the fact that
custody decisions also reflect and shape society's attitude to-
ward women and motherhood. Within this privatized perspec-
tive, women lose their group identity. Women no longer have a
political definition as women, and the custody of children
ceases to be an issue of gender politics. The fall of the tender
years doctrine thus depoliticizes the issue of custody and de-
prives individual mothers of their children one at a time,
mother by mother.
2. As a Victory for Women. - (a) Ideological Victory. -
The fall of the tender years doctrine is an ideological victory for
women because it is an assertion of sexual equality; it rein-
forces notions of co-parenting and of fathers sharing responsi-
bility for the emotional development of children. The fall of the
tender years doctrine legitimates the desires of those men who
wish to nurture children; it also legitimates the wishes of those
mothers who do not want custody of their children. An impli-
cation of the tender years doctrine, that only unfit mothers do
not have custody of their children, loses some of its strength
with the fall of the doctrine.
64. See Mnookin, supra note 21.
65. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360, 362 (W. Va. 1981), discussed in
Polikoff, supra note 46, at 241-43.
66. On the "feminization of poverty," see Barbara Ehrenreich & Karen Stal-
lard, The Nouveau Poor, Ms., July-Aug. 1982, at 217.
67. See inft, p. 17.
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(b) Practical Victory. - There are practical benefits that
result from the fall of the tender years doctrine. In some cases,
the absence of the doctrine leads to a better custody decision
for the child. Additionally, the courts' focus on the best inter-
ests of the child enables some women who do not fit the stere-
otypical maternal. image associated with the tender years
doctrine to present a coherent argument and occasionally to
obtain custody. Under the tender years doctrine, for example,
courts frequently decided that any evidence of non-marital sex-
ual activity proved a mother "unfit."Ge From such a perspective,
lesbianism would certainly be the epitome of unfitness. While it
is still extremely difficult for lesbians to keep custody of their
children,69 they now have a better chance at custody because of
the current focus on the child's needs.
C. An Alternative to the Tender Years Doctrine
My assertion that there are both good and bad effects to
every reform or to every change does not imply that these ef-
fects balance out and, therefore, make little difference. Rather,
I maintain that we must or should be far more thorough in
evaluating any proposed reform or change. An important rea-
son for examining the particular good or bad effects of any pro-
posal is that, by doing so, we can make a more precise and
correct evaluation of the actual overall effect of any reform.
A close examination may also help to devise alternatives
or a middle ground between the status quo and a proposed
change. For example, in the case of child custody, a possible
middle ground is a doctrine giving custodial preference not to
the mother, but to the child's primary attachment figure, 70 be it
the mother or the father.71 Such a rule, like the abolition of the
68. See Henry Foster & Doris Freed, Child Custody (Part 1), 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
423, 429-31 (1964). See generally Mary Dunlap, Toward Recognition of "A Right
To Be Sexual," 7 Women's Rts. L Rep. 245 (1982) (discussing different judicial
attitudes toward sexuality of women and men).
69. See Nan Hunter & Nancy Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Le-
gal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 Buffalo L Rev. 691 (1976).
70. John Bowlby has widely disseminated this concept of a primary attach-
ment figure. See John Bowlby, Maternal [sic) Care and Mental Health (1951);
John Bowlby, Attachment (1969); John Bowlby, Separation: Anxiety and Anger
(1973); John Bowlby, Loss, Sadness and Depression (1980).
71. Nancy Polikoff has made the very interesting, related suggestion that there
be a preference for the parent who has been the child's primary caretaker. See
Polikoff, supra note 46, at 241-43. See also Ramsay Klaff, The Tender Years Doc-
trine: A Defense, 70 Calif. L Rev. 335 (1982) (apparently supporting the pri-




tender years doctrine, would avoid sexual stereotyping and en-
courage male responsibility for children. But because the "pri-
mary attachment" test is more determinate than the "best
interests of the child" test, the suggested rule would reduce the
potential intimidation that fathers can now exercise by threat-
ening a custody battle. This change is especially important in
the case of an economically dependent mother who has de-
voted most of her married life to child care. Moreover, a court
applying the "primary attachment" test will have greater diffi-
culty taking custody away from a lesbian mother who proves
that she is the child's primary attachment figure.
Although I support the primary attachment doctrine, I rec-
ognize that it has disadvantages. The doctrine tends to make
child custody decisions dependent upon the "experts" who de-
termine "primary attachment." Many people believe that ex-
perts already determine too much of our lives.72 Furthermore,
the doctrine presupposes that a child will be primarily attached
to one person. Thus, the doctrine reinforces some of the worst
aspects of the nuclear family ideology, including the assump-
tion that one person is primarily responsible for child care.7
Also, the proposal assumes child custody determinations will
remain adversarial and create winners and losers in a patriar-
chal legal system. 74 Finally, the primary attachment doctrine
diverts attention from the destructiveness of a society trying to
raise children in unstable nuclear families with no significant
group support.
IV. Conclusion
Legal reforms have ambiguous and contradictory effects.
Yet the only way to bring about major changes may be to begin
with minor ones. We must make political decisions and act,
even though our efforts may sometimes backfire. The more
completely and accurately we analyze reforms, the greater the
possibility we have to promote those reforms that-sometime
in the future-we will recognize to have been the beginnings of
a revolution.
72. See, e.g., Lasch, aupra note 24.
73. For good discussions of the problems created by this system, see Nancy
Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering (1978); Dorothy Dinnerstein, The
Mermaid and the Minotaur (1977). See also Isaac Balbus, Marxism and Domi-
nation (1982).
74. Andrew Watson writes poignantly on the dangers and disadvantages of
such decisions. See Andrew Watson, Children of Arnageddom" Problems of
Custody Following Divorce, 21 Syracuse L Rev. 55 (1969).
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